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Abstract
In the matching with contracts setting, we provide two new axiomatic characterizations of
the “cumulative offer process” (COP ) in the domain of hospital choices satisfying “unilateral
substitutes” and “irrelevance of rejected contracts.” We say that a mechanism is truncation-
proof if no doctor can ever benefit from truncating his preferences. Our first result shows
that the COP is the unique stable and truncation-proof mechanism. Next, we say that a
mechanism is invariant to lower tail preferences change if any doctor’s assignment does not
depend on his preferences over worse contracts. Our second characterization shows that a
mechanism is stable and invariant to lower tail preferences change if and only if it is the
COP .
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1 Introduction
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) introduce a matching with contract framework which admits
the Gale and Shapley (1962)’s standard matching and Kelso and Crawford (1982)’s labor
market models as its special cases.1 They adopt the substitutes condition in the conventional
matching literature (e.g., see Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) and introduce a “Cumulative Of-
fer Process” (henceforth, COP ), which is a generalization of the doctor-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (henceforth, DA) of Gale and Shapley (1962). Hatfield and Milgrom
(2005) then show that the COP produces stable allocations whenever contracts are substi-
tutes. Indeed, it produces the doctor-optimal stable allocation–the unanimously preferred
stable allocation by doctors to any other stable allocation. Moreover, they show that the
COP becomes strategy-proof2 with an additional “Law of Aggregate Demand” condition
(LAD).
Since then, the COP has been the main mechanism in the matching with contract lit-
erature and received attention from researchers. Hatfield and Kojima (2010) introduce two
weaker conditions than substitutes (from weaker to stronger): “bilateral substitutes” (BS)
and “unilateral substitutes” (US) and show that the COP is stable under the former, and it
produces the doctor-optimal stable allocation under the latter. They also show its immunity
against preference manipulations under US and the LAD. All of these results are obtained
for the case where hospitals have choices, rather than preferences, as primitives with an ad-
ditional “irrelevance of rejected contracts” (IRC) condition by Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2013).
There are other studies as to the COP , and some of them are to be visited in the next
Related Literature section.
In this paper, we provide two axiomatic characterizations of the COP in the domain of
choice functions which are US satisfying the IRC. While there are various axiomatizations
of its predecessor DA in the standard matching framework for various domains, to the best
1Echhenique (2012) shows that under the substitutes condition of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), matching
with contracts problems can be embedded into Kelso and Crawford (1982)’s setting.
2That is, no doctor ever has incentive to misreport his preferences.
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of our knowledge, there are only two studies providing characterizations of the COP in the
current matching with contract setting. First, Hatfield and Kojima (2010) show that under
US and the IRC, the COP is the most favorable stable mechanism for the doctor side, that
is, it is the doctor-optimal stable mechanism. In another recent study, Hatfield et al. (2015)
provide three conditions giving the maximal hospital choices domain to have a stable and
strategy-proof mechanism, and within that domain, the COP is the unique such mechanism.
Their tree conditions are weaker than the combination of US and the LAD. As we do not
impose the latter, their results do not imply ours.
Our first characterization is as to the COP ’s strategic properties. A preference list is
said to be a truncation of another preference list if the relative rankings of the contracts
remain the same while the set of contracts which are better than being unassigned shrinks
under the truncation. Truncation strategies are well-studied in the literature. They are
shown to be easy strategies to be used in certain sense by Roth and Rothblum (1999).
Moreover, Mongell and Roth (1991) empirically document that agents have used them in
real-life matching problems. Hence, truncation strategies are important for both theoretical
and practical purposes; thereby it is desirable for a mechanism to be at least immune to
truncations if it is not strategy-proof. Due to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), we know that
the COP is not strategy-proof under the substitutes and the IRC conditions.3 Yet, our first
theorem shows that under the weaker US and the IRC conditions, the COP is immune to
truncations; and indeed, it is the unique such stable mechanism.
Our second axiomatization deals with certain invariance property. One could argue that
doctors’ assignments should not depend on their preferences over worse alternatives. Our
invariance axiom formalizes this, and we say that a mechanism is invariant to lower tail
preferences change if no doctor’s assignment depends on his preferences over worse contracts.
We show that under US and the IRC, the COP is the unique stable and invariant to lower
tail preferences change mechanism.
3They assume that hospitals have underlying preferences, inducing their choices. Therefore, the IRC
automatically comes.
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One thing to emphasize is that the COP is shown to coincide with the DA under US
and the IRC (see Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)). Hence, this
paper effectively axiomatizes the DA; however we prefer referring to the mechanism as the
COP in order to stick to the matching with contracts literature. In relation to this, another
way of stating the paper’s contribution is that it provides characterizations of the DA in
the largest choice domain up to date in the literature for which axiomatization of the DA is
offered.4
2 Related Literature
Beside the theoretical appeal of the matching with contract framework, recent surge in
the literature shows its practical relevance. So¨nmez and Switzer (2013) and So¨nmez (2013)
formulate cadet-branch matching in the U.S. Army as a matching with contracts problem.
Both papers show that the currently used mechanisms fail to admit desirable properties,
and they propose to replace them by the COP . Kominers and So¨nmez (2013) allow school
priorities to change across seats within schools in school choice. They study the problem in
the matching with contracts framework and offer the COP to be used and show that their
results also have applications to airline seat upgrades and affirmative action problems. In
other recent papers, Aygu¨n and Bo (2014) and Aygu¨n and Turhan (2014) consider affirmative
action policies in Brazil and Indian colleges and document the weaknesses of the current
mechanisms. They both study the problem in the matching with contract setting and propose
the COP against the currently used mechanisms.
Given that the COP has proved to be important for both theoretical and practical
purposes, various properties of it have been studied in the literature. Hatfield and Kojima
(2010) show that under US, no previously rejected contract is accepted in a later step in
4As pointed out earlier, Hatfield et al. (2015)’s conditions are weaker than the combination of US and
the LAD. As we do not impose the latter, their domain does not include ours. This is also obvious from
the results. They show that the COP is strategy-proof in their domain, yet it fails to be so in the current
US and IRC domain (see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)).
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the course of the COP . This result is extended to the case where hospitals have choices,
instead of preferences, with the additional IRC by Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012). Hatfield and
Milgrom (2005) introduce a version of the COP in which doctors make offers simultaneously,
whereas in Hatfield and Kojima (2010)’s version, doctors make offers sequentially. Hirata
and Kasuya (2014) prove that under BS and the IRC, these two versions coincide with each
other regardless of the order in which doctors make offer in the sequential version. Afacan
(2014) demonstrates that the COP is both resource and extension monotonic under US and
the IRC; and with the additional LAD, it also respects improvements.
There are many axiomatic characterization papers on well-known and in use matching
mechanisms, including Boston, Top Trading Cycles (attributed to David Gale), and the DA.
Some of them are Kojima and U¨nver (2014), Afacan (2013), Abdulkadirog˘lu and Che (2010),
Dur (2015), Morrill (2013b), Kojima and Manea (2010), Morrill (2013a), and Alcalde and
Barbera (1994).
3 The Model and Results
There are finite sets D and H of doctors and hospitals, and a finite set X of contracts.
Each contract x ∈ X is associated with one doctor xD ∈ D and one hospital xH ∈ H. Each
doctor can sign at most one contract. The null contract, denoted by ∅, means that the doctor
has no contract. For X ′ ⊆ X, let X ′D = {d ∈ D : ∃ x ∈ X ′ with xD = d}.
Each doctor d ∈ D has a strict preference relation Pd over {x ∈ X : xD = d} ∪ {∅}.
Given any two contracts x′, x where x′D = xD = d, we write x
′Rdx only if x′Pdx or x′ = x.
A contract x is acceptable to doctor d if xPd∅. It is otherwise unacceptable. The chosen
contract of doctor d from X ′ ⊆ X is given as
Cd(X
′) = max
Pd
[{x ∈ X ′ : xD = d } ∪ {∅}].
We write CD(X
′) =
⋃
d∈D Cd(X
′) for the set of contracts chosen from X ′ by some doctor.
Let P = (Pd)d∈D be the preference profile of the doctors.
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Each hospital h has a choice function Ch : 2
X → 2X defined as follows: for any X ′ ⊆ X,
Ch(X
′) ∈ {X ′′ ⊆ X ′ : (for each x ∈ X ′′, xH = h) and (for any x′, x′′ ∈ X ′′, x′D 6= x′′D)}.
We write CH(X
′) =
⋃
h∈H Ch(X
′) for the set of contracts chosen from X ′ by some hospi-
tal. The choice function profile of hospitals is C = (Ch)h∈H . In the rest of the paper, we fix
D, H, and C; thereby we suppress them from the notation and just write P to denote the
problem.
A set of contracts X ′ ⊆ X is an allocation if x, x′ ∈ X ′ and x 6= x′ imply xD 6= x′D. We
extend the preferences of doctors over the set of allocations in a natural way as follows: for
any given two allocations X ′ and X ′′, X ′PdX ′′ if and only if {x′ ∈ X ′ : x′D = d} Pd{x′′ ∈
X ′′ : x′′D = d}.
Definition 1. An allocation X ′ is stable if
(1) CD(X
′) = CH(X ′) = X ′ and
(2) there exist no hospital h and set of contracts X ′′ 6= Ch(X ′) such that X ′′ = Ch(X ′ ∪
X ′′) ⊆ CD(X ′ ∪X ′′).
A mechanism ψ is a function producing an allocation ψ(P ) for any problem P . Mecha-
nism ψ is stable if ψ(P ) is stable for every problem P .
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) generalize Gale and Shapley (1962)’s celebrated DA to the
matching with contracts problem by introducing the following COP .
Step 1: One arbitrarily chosen doctor d offers her first choice contract x1. The of-
fer receiving hospital h holds the contract if x1 = Ch({x1}) and rejects it otherwise. Let
Ah(1) = {x1} and Ah′(1) = ∅ for all h′ 6= h.
In general,
Step t: One arbitrarily chosen doctor currently having no contract held by any hospital
offers her preferred contract xt from among those that have not been rejected in the previ-
ous steps. The offer receiving hospital h holds xt if xt ∈ Ch(Ah(t− 1) ∪ {xt}) and rejects it
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otherwise. Let Ah(t) = Ah(t− 1) ∪ {xt} and Ah′(t) = Ah′(t− 1) for all h′ 6= h.
The algorithm terminates when every doctor is matched to a hospital or every unmatched
doctor has all acceptable contracts rejected. As there are finite contracts, the algorithm
terminates in some finite step T . The final outcome is
⋃
h∈H Ch(Ah(T )).
The COP may not even produce an allocation without any structure on hospital choices.
The following two conditions have proved to be useful.
Definition 2 (Hatfield and Kojima (2010)). Contracts are unilateral substitutes (US) for
hospital h if there are no set of contracts Y ⊂ X and another pair of contracts x, z ∈ X \ Y
such that
z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}), zD /∈ YD, and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
In words, US ensures that if a rejected contract z of doctor zD from Y starts to be chosen
whenever a new contract x becomes available, then that doctor has to have another contract
in Y .
Definition 3 (Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2013)). Contracts satisfy the irrelevance of rejected
contracts (IRC) for hospital h if for any Y ⊂ X and z ∈ X \ Y ,
z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}) ⇒ Ch(Y ) = Ch(Y ∪ {z}).
The IRC requires that the removal of rejected contracts has no effect on the chosen sets.5
Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012) show that the COP produces
stable allocation even under the weaker BS6 and the IRC conditions; thereby the COP is a
stable mechanism under US and the IRC. In what follows, we provide two axiomatizations
of the COP under US and the IRC.
5In the many-to-many matching context (without contracts), Blair (1988) and Alkan (2002) use this
condition. The latter refers to it as “consistency.”
6See Footnote 11 for its definition.
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For a given doctor d with preferences Pd, let Ac(Pd) = {x ∈ X : xD = d and xPd∅}. That
is, it is the set of contracts doctor d finds acceptable. A preference list P ′d is a truncation of
Pd if Ac(P
′
d) ⊂ Ac(Pd), and for any x, x′ ∈ X with xD = x′D = d, xPdx′ if and only if xP ′dx′.
Definition 4. A mechanism ψ is truncation-proof if there are no problem P , doctor d ∈ D,
and a truncation P ′d such that ψ(P
′
d, P−d)Pdψ(P ).
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Roth and Rothblum (1999) demonstrate that truncation strategies are easy to employ in
the sense that agents need less information about others’ preferences to profitably employ
them. On the practical ground, on the other hand, Mongell and Roth (1991) show that
truncation strategies have been employed in real-life matching problems. Therefore, it is
desirable for a mechanism to be truncation-proof in both theory and practice. We already
know that the COP is not strategy-proof under US and the IRC. However, our first result
below shows that it is at least non-manipulable by truncation strategies; and furthermore,
it is the unique such rule among stable mechanisms.
Theorem 1. Under US and the IRC, a mechanism is stable and truncation-proof if and
only if it is the COP .
Proof. See Appendix.
We now introduce another axiom, which is new in the literature even though close variants
of it have been introduced in other settings. It restricts how a mechanism responds to certain
changes in preferences. For a given doctor d with his preferences Pd and a contract of himself
x, let U(Pd, x) = {x′ ∈ X : x′D = d and x′Rdx}. That is, it is the set of all contracts which
are no worse than x. Moreover, let Pd|U(Pd,x)
be the restriction of Pd to U(Pd, x), that is, it
is the part of Pd over U(Pd, x).
Definition 5. A mechanism ψ is invariant to lower tail preferences change if for any problem
P , any doctor d ∈ D, and any P ′d such that Pd|U(Pd,ψd(P )) = P
′
d|U(Pd,ψd(P ))
, ψd(P ) = ψd(P
′
d, P−d).
7P−d is the preference profile of all doctors but doctor d.
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Less formally, it imposes that no doctor’s assignment depends on his preferences over less
preferred contracts. Different variants of this axiom have been introduced in other contexts.8
Theorem 2. Under US and the IRC, a mechanism is stable and invariant to lower tail
preferences change if and only if it is the COP .
Proof. See Appendix.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that stability are separately independent of truncation-
proofness and invariance to lower tail preferences change. Moreover, truncation-proofness
and invariance to lower tail preferences change are independent of each other as well. To see
this, consider a problem instance where there exist one doctor d and one hospital h. Suppose
that there are three different contracts: x, x′, and x′′. Let P : x, x′, x′′, ∅ and P ′ : x, ∅, x′, x′′.9
Hospital h has preferences as well and let Ph : x, x
′, x′′, ∅.10 Consider a mechanism ψ such
that ψ(P ) = {x} and ψ(P ′) = {∅}, and it coincides with the COP at other instances. It is
truncation-proof; however it is not invariant to lower tail preferences change.
For the converse, let P ′′ : x, x′, ∅, x′′ and consider mechanism φ such that φ(P ) = φ(P ′′) =
{x′′}, φ(P ′) = {x′}, and φ(Pˆ ) = {x′} for any other Pˆ . It is invariant to lower tail preferences
change, yet it is not truncation-proof.
Remark 2. Our characterizations do not carry over to the larger domain of BS and
the IRC.11 Specifically, the COP loses invariance to lower tail preferences changes. On the
other hand, while it is still truncation-proof,12 it is not the unique such mechanism among
8In the random matching context, some stronger variants of this axiom have been used in different
papers, including Hashimoto and Hirata (2011), Hashimoto et al. (2014), Bogomolnaia and Heo (2011), and
Heo and Yilmaz (2015).
9The earlier a contract appears in a preference list, the more preferred it is. For instance, under P , x is
the top contract, then x′, and so on. The same way of writing applies to hospital preferences as well.
10Note that hospital choices satisfy both US and the IRC.
11Contracts are BS if there are no set of contracts Y ⊂ X and another pair of contracts x, z ∈ X \ Y
such that z /∈ Ch(Y ∪ {z}), zD, xD /∈ YD, and z ∈ Ch(Y ∪ {x, z}).
12To see this, if a doctor truncates his preferences such that the last offer he makes in the COP under
the true preference profile is still acceptable, then the outcome would not change. Otherwise, he becomes
unassigned in some step. In this case, from the proof of Theorem 1 of Hatfield and Kojima (2010), we know
that no contract of him is accepted after that step; thereby becomes unassigned at the end of the COP .
Hence, the COP is truncation-proof under BS and the IRC.
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stable solutions. To see these, let D = {d1, d2} and H = {h1}. Consider the following
preference profile (assuming that the hospital’s choices are generated by its preferences):
Pd1 : x, x
′, ∅; Pd2 : y, y′, ∅; Ph1 : {x, y′}  x′  y  x  ..anything..  ∅.
It is easy to verify that the contracts are BS (not US), satisfying the IRC.13 The
COP outcome at the above problem is {x, y′}. Let us now consider P ′d1 : x, ∅, x′. Then,
COP (P ′d1 , Pd2) = {y}. Therefore, it is not invariant to lower tail preferences change under
BS and the IRC.
For the other case, consider the same set of doctors and hospital along with the same
doctor preferences. Let the hospital preferences be as follows:
P ′h1 : {x′, y′}  {x, y′}  x′  y  {x, y}  ..anything..  ∅.
It is easy to verify that the contracts are BS (not US), satisfying the IRC. The COP
outcome above is {x′, y′}. Consider another stable mechanism φ where it produces {x, y′}
at the above problem, and it coincides with the COP at other problem instances. It is
truncation-proof as well as stable.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. “If” Part. Under US and the IRC, due to Hatfield and Kojima (2010)
and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012), we already know that the COP is stable. We also know
that under US and the IRC, no previously rejected contract is accepted in a later step in
the course of the COP . In other words, the COP coincides with the DA. Hence, if a doctor
truncates his preferences, he would either receive the same contract as at the true preference
profile or be unassigned. In either case, he would not benefit from truncating, showing that
the COP is truncation-proof under US and the IRC.
13Because the hospital’s choices are generated by its preferences, the contracts automatically satisfy the
IRC.
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“Only If” Part. Let ψ be a stable mechanism which is truncation-proof. Assume for a
contradiction that ψ 6= COP , and let P be such that ψ(P ) 6= COP (P ). For ease of notation,
let ψ(P ) = X ′ and COP (P ) = X ′′. For any allocation X and doctor d, let xd be doctor d’s
contract at X.
Let S0 = {d ∈ D : X ′′PdX ′}. From Hatfield and Kojima (2010), we know that X ′′ is at
least as good as X ′ for any doctor. This, along with X ′ 6= X ′′, implies that S0 is a non-empty
set. Let d1 ∈ S and consider P ′d1 which is the truncation of Pd1 such that x /∈ Ac(P ′d1) if and
only if xD = d1 and x
′′
d1
Pd1x. Let P
1 = (P ′d1 , P−d1).
As the COP coincides with the DA under US and the IRC, we have COP (P 1) = X ′′.
On the other hand, due to the truncation-proofness of ψ, we have ψd1(P
1) = ∅.
Let S1 = {d ∈ D : X ′′Pdψ(P 1)} \ {d1}. We now claim that S1 is non-empty. Assume
for a contradiction that it is empty. This means that for any doctor d ∈ D \ {d1}, we have
x′′d = ψd(P
1). This is because X ′′ cannot be worse than ψ(P 1) for any doctor under US and
the IRC (Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez (2012)). Moreover, we have
ψd1(P
1) = ∅. These, however, contradict the stability of ψ(P 1), as doctor d1 would block it
with his assigned hospital at X ′′ through signing contract x′′d1 . This shows that S
1 6= ∅.
Let d2 ∈ S1 and, similar to above, consider P ′d2 which is the truncation of Pd2 such that
x /∈ Ac(P ′d2) if and only if xD = d2 and x′′d2Pd2x. Define P 2 = (P ′d2 , P 1−d2). By the same reason
as above, COP (P 2) = X ′′ and ψd2(P
2) = ∅. Moreover, by the definition of P 2 and the fact
that COP is the doctor-optimal stable mechanism, either ψd1(P
2) = ∅ or ψd1(P 2) = x′′d1 .
Let us now define S2 = {d ∈ D : X ′′Pdψ(P 2)} \ {d1, d2}. Similar to above, we claim
that S2 is non-empty. Assume for a contradiction that it is empty. This means that for
any doctor d ∈ D \ {d1, d2}, x′′d = ψd(P 2). On the other hand, we have ψd2(P 2) = ∅. In
either case of ψd1(P
2) = ∅ or ψd1(P 2) = x′′d1 , doctor d2 would block ψ(P 2) with his assigned
hospital at X ′′ through signing contract x′′d2 , contradicting the stability of ψ(P
2).14 Hence,
14If ψd1(P
2) = x′′d1 , then it is direct to see that blocking. On the other hand, if ψd1(P
2) = ∅, then let
(x′′d2)H = h. If (x
′′
d1
)H 6= h, then again it is straightforward to see the blocking. Suppose that (x′′d1)H = h.
Then, by the stability of X ′′, x′′d2 ∈ Ch(X ′′). By US, it also has to be that x′′d2 ∈ Ch(X ′′ \ {x′′d1}). Hence,
the blocking is present in this case as well.
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S2 is non-empty.
If we keep applying the same arguments above, each iteration would give us a different
doctor. This, however, contradicts the finiteness of the doctor set, contradicting our starting
supposition that ψ 6= COP . This finishes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. “If” Part. From Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygu¨n and So¨nmez
(2012), we know that under US and the IRC, no previously rejected contract is accepted
in a later step in the COP . This easily implies that the COP is invariant to lower tail
preferences change.
“Only If” Part. We now claim that stability and invariance to lower tail preferences
change together implies truncation-proofness.15 Let ψ be a stable mechanism which is in-
variant to lower tail preferences change. Assume for a contradiction that it is not truncation-
proof. That is, there exist a problem instance P , doctor d, and a truncation P ′d of Pd such
that ψd(P ) = x and ψd(P
′
d, P−d) = x
′ with x′Pdx. Due to the stability of ψ and the manipu-
lation via truncation P ′d, there exists a contract x
′′ 6= x′ with x′′D = d and x′Pdx′′Pd∅ (it may
be that x = x′′).
Let P ′′d be the truncation such that x˜ /∈ Ac(P ′′d ) if and only if x˜D = d and x′Pdx˜. Then, due
to the invariance to lower tail preferences change property of ψ, we have ψd(P
′′
d , P−d) = x
′.
This, along with ψd(P ) = x, contradicts ψ being invariant to lower tail preferences change.
The above observation, along with Theorem 1, finishes the proof.
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